日前,国外安全研究组织Nikita Tarakanov称在Symantec PGP Whole Disk Encryption(完整磁盘加密软件)中发现0day漏洞,该软件的内核驱动程序pgpwded.sys包含一个覆盖任意内存的漏洞,可执行任意代码,受影响的软件版本是Symantec PGP Desktop 10.2.0 Build 2599。% ]# x% E' H+ W# p5 ~* ^! W
7 a' q# P; ~( {: D. S" mSymantec通过博客文章证实该版本软件确实存在安全问题,但是利用起来比较繁琐,并且仅限于运行在Windows XP和Windows 2003的系统,成功利用该漏洞需要有计算机本地访问权限。
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研究员Kelvin Kwan称“该漏洞触发场景非常困难,成功利用必须进入一些错误状态,但是成功利用的话可能允许攻击者执行任意代码,获取更高级别的权限”。该漏洞详细细节如下:+ Q7 g6 l' w! y. N0 e$ W& e
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O/ ]; T$ L4 Nfunction at 0x10024C20 is responsible for dispatching ioctl codes:
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, ^( ^( y4 X- L9 s2 f- _: m.text:10024C20 ; int __thiscall ioctl_handler_deep(int this, int ioctl, PVOID inbuff, unsigned int inbuff_size, unsigned int outbuff_size, PDWORD bytes_to_return)
4 h6 r! S2 ? N* }+ K6 f.text:10024C20 ioctl_handler_deep proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_10007520+6Ap7 J( f3 ?/ j$ D) n& y+ W; r& K
.text:10024C20
1 n; _9 E; w) g z/ i# v4 ].text:10024C20 DestinationString= UNICODE_STRING ptr -3Ch: c$ A1 O: C8 V( y9 V* F
.text:10024C20 var_31 = byte ptr -31h+ C* n4 {2 W. T" k8 b+ p$ M3 O
.text:10024C20 var_30 = dword ptr -30h: U) x- b5 G7 L* |( K9 |
.text:10024C20 some_var = dword ptr -2Ch
' g- h+ c3 d4 ~.text:10024C20 var_28 = dword ptr -28h
2 U8 V$ A T8 T' @$ R7 P.text:10024C20 var_24 = byte ptr -24h T! ?* i" @5 }4 m; w, u* c/ k
.text:10024C20 var_5 = byte ptr -5
; T: I0 c5 G& z) R$ r+ W.text:10024C20 var_4 = dword ptr -41 {5 u8 V# c- A: d: O* H+ |) }
.text:10024C20 ioctl = dword ptr 8
* I4 a' R7 O! v, O' x.text:10024C20 inbuff = dword ptr 0Ch
/ r; O" K6 ]- a$ t+ j.text:10024C20 inbuff_size = dword ptr 10h
6 l7 N! B. L$ b4 \ y.text:10024C20 outbuff_size = dword ptr 14h- \6 W! q+ G! V; m$ t- W, F
.text:10024C20 bytes_to_return = dword ptr 18h
% q: n! l4 Y( O# }$ v, C: z9 x.text:10024C20& p; Y, ]1 s2 b0 `. Q5 C( x' s9 B9 E
.text:10024C20 push ebp
t8 y5 \/ U& B$ L; M* U- D) y.text:10024C21 mov ebp, esp" Z+ v# I$ P/ W X# ?; P1 g2 _
.text:10024C23 sub esp, 3Ch( r" S3 J2 m% ` V( L
.text:10024C26 mov eax, BugCheckParameter2 j( ^: R. T7 p0 K5 d! ^
.text:10024C2B xor eax, ebp8 S; f, `2 h w- l9 V9 }5 K2 Y
.text:10024C2D mov [ebp+var_4], eax
: A( [: `2 Y. B c$ ]; q.text:10024C30 mov eax, [ebp+ioctl]
2 t- N6 R# }4 r: @8 H1 H.text:10024C33 push ebx
- Z s" e# v1 @* b( i.text:10024C34 mov ebx, [ebp+inbuff]
o7 E4 h% V/ o.text:10024C37 push esi; H! c5 Y0 J* S
.text:10024C38 mov esi, [ebp+bytes_to_return]
. G% ~7 K9 G- ~2 z7 ~1 F( _.text:10024C3B add eax, 7FFDDFD8h1 c5 Z |, C& {, K- B7 Z- `. Q
.text:10024C40 push edi" M# I; k3 V5 W/ I0 q
.text:10024C41 mov edi, ecx
, E0 F: X: |6 }/ h& @.text:10024C43 mov [ebp+some_var], esi% j+ l. l3 a9 {' [0 X
.text:10024C46 mov [ebp+var_28], 08 I# Q5 O- @1 M" {
.text:10024C4D cmp eax, 0A4h ; switch 165 cases
9 r0 Z8 j g: ~) E.text:10024C52 ja loc_10025B18 ; jumptable 10024C5F default case2 ~. L; a& {6 I7 [4 |9 W1 o& E* P% ~
.text:10024C58 movzx eax, ds:byte_10025BF0[eax]6 q8 ^8 e y! Y# I% K; V4 r. ~
.text:10024C5F jmp ds ff_10025B50[eax*4] ; switch jump
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0x80022058 case: no check for outbuff_size == 0! <--- FLAW!
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.text:10024F5A lea ecx, [edi+958h]
# a9 Y" s, t# l) ?: I.text:10024F60 call sub_100237B0
3 F3 ]: {$ z% t2 g& j$ I0 P, _.text:10024F65 mov [ebp+some_var], eax. y; P& s0 A7 ~4 h$ ?
.text:10024F68 test eax, eax
1 w" p6 {/ g/ \; |: G, S. i( ^& h1 R! G.text:10024F6A jnz short loc_10024F7D
$ l- m, C: d( }& A8 [+ M9 S6 C/ {.text:10024F6C mov dword ptr [ebx], 0FFFFCFFAh" {$ N, k I# r0 G: r
.text:10024F72 mov dword ptr [esi], 10h <--- bytes to copy to output buffer
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next in IofComplete request will be rep movsd at pointer, that is under attacker's control
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Due the type of vulnerability (METHO_BUFFERED with output_size == 0) exploit works only on Winows XP/2k3, cause in later Windows OS I/O manager doesn't craft IRP if ioctl is METHOD_BUFFERED and output_size == 0.
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Symantec表示在2月份的补丁包中修复该漏洞。8 W$ u, W l" N* F0 H
9 E- N) \& G5 \" A+ a1 L相关阅读:$ U& C) D) a" p+ C
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赛门铁克的 PGP Whole Disk Encryption 为企业提供了全面的高性能完整磁盘加密功能,可对台式机、笔记本电脑和可移动介质上的所有数据(用户文件、交换文件、系统文件、隐藏文件等)进行完整磁盘加密。该完整磁盘加密软件可让数据免遭未经授权的访问,从而为知识产权、客户和合作伙伴数据提供强大的安全防护。受保护的系统可由 PGP Universal Server 集中管理,这就简化了部署、策略创建、分发和报告过程。( E2 E/ x! b: {) ]
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